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Executive Summary 
 
Targeted disinformation campaigns are a cheap and effective way to create real harms that have 
a society-wide impact. This form of information warfare capitalizes on inherent features of the 
internet messaging platforms and the free nature of democratic societies to spread false and 
malicious content designed to increase discord by exacerbating existing social and political 
chasms, promote chaos and fear, and generate distrust toward government. A better 
understanding and immediate action to mitigate this problem are vital. Right now, Russia is in 
the process of using online disinformation to influence American democracy in the lead up to the 
2020 election1. Additionally, Russian efforts are being employed to spread lies about the current 
ongoing global health emergency caused by Covid-192. Even more alarming are indications that 
China is beginning to use these very tactics of information warfare to promote fear and panic 
regarding Covid-193. 
 
The following model illustrates the tactics used by foreign disinformation actors. Using 
knowledge of existing political and social fissures within a society, foreign disinformation actors 
target specific populations for influence. First, false and malicious content is created to appeal to 
these pre-determined audiences. These false narratives are then spread into the information 
ecosystems of societies through the manipulation of online social media platform algorithms that 
are designed to increase user activity and advertising revenue.  
 
 
 
 
Goal: Spread false and malicious content to exacerbate existing societal tensions, stoke negative 
emotions, and promote chaos, discord, and distrust.  
 
                                                
1 Rosenberg, M., Perlroth, N., & Sanger, D. E. (2020, January 10). 'Chaos Is the Point': Russian Hackers and Trolls Grow 
Stealthier in 2020. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/us/politics/russia-hacking-disinformation-election.html 
2 Barnes, J. E., Rosenberg, M., & Wong, E. (2020, March 28). As Virus Spreads, China and Russia See Openings for 
Disinformation. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/politics/china-russia-coronavirus-disinformation.html 
3 Wong, E., Rosenberg, M., & Barnes, J. E. (2020, April 22). Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed Virus Panic 
in U.S., Officials Say. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-
disinformation.html?action=click&module=Top Stories&pgtype=Homepage 
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Immediate government action can be taken to combat the threat of targeted online disinformation 
campaigns. The following response framework has four components to address each stage of the 
disinformation model: allocating government responsibility, increasing information-sharing 
capabilities, increasing online platform reliability, and building public resilience.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to give a historical overview of foreign state-backed 
disinformation efforts, insight into modern disinformation tactics and why they are effective, and 
apply this analysis to a real-world scenario to inform the general public and key decision-makers 
while identifying potential areas of government action to combat this threat. Modern 
disinformation campaigns are being utilized to sow discord in the American democratic system. 
They creatively use social media platforms to plant and spread false narratives designed to 
generate chaos and distrust within a targeted environment. These tactics are low cost and have 
the potential for a devastating impact. Currently, this form of information warfare is being 
conducted by foreign state actors and is a threat that will not dissipate without effective 
government action. Disinformation tactics are so destructive because they use precise aspects of 
democratic societies to create harm, at the same time eroding the very mechanisms used to 
generate solutions to challenging issues.  
 
The subsequent analysis seeks to answer two specific research questions. First, what are the 
tactics of modern disinformation campaigns, and why are they so effective? Second, what 
government action can be taken to combat the threat of targeted disinformation campaigns that 
effectively focuses on the specific aspects of modern disinformation efforts while being mindful 
of threats to civil liberties and the need for a swift, bi-partisan response? Undoubtedly, a greater 
•The	foundation	of	an	effective	response.	Establishes	
guidelines	and	procedures	for	a	clear	and	cohesive	response	
strategy.	
Allocate	Government	
Responsibility	
•Quickly	identify	threat	actors	and	the	content	that	they	have	
produced,	and	communicate	this	vital	information	to	front	
line	actors.	
Increase	Information	
Sharing	
•Platforms	(under	the	direction	of	national	security	experts)	can	use	
their	technical	expertise	to	take	down	harmful	content	produced	by	
threat	actors.	
•Limits	to	the	application	of	personal	data	decrease	a	threat	actor’s	
ability	for	algorithmic	exploitation.
Increase	Online	
Platform	Liability	
•A	critical	component	of	a	cohesive,	whole-of-society	
approach	to	combat	disinformation.	Gives	citizens	more	
opportunities	to	use	their	critical	thinking	to	limit	the	impact	
of	false	narratives	that	have	broken	through.		
Build	Public	
Resilience
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understanding of the intricacies of targeted disinformation warfare, and the highlighting of 
potential bi-partisan government action can lead to progress on this issue. These questions are 
examined through the lens of disinformation efforts supported by the Russian government. 
Russian backed targeted disinformation campaigns and their historical development are both 
well documented and pertinent to American national security. The threat posed by Russia is high. 
However, targeted disinformation warfare extends beyond Russia and can be utilized by a wide 
range of state actors that wish to harm free democratic societies.  
 
Overview of Disinformation 
 
What sets disinformation apart is the intention of an actor. While misinformation is the sharing 
of false information that is believed to be accurate, disinformation is the spread of false and 
inflammatory information, correct or otherwise, by an actor with the intent to mislead and cause 
harm4. The ultimate objective of modern disinformation actors is to create a disorganized and 
chaotic information landscape5. As disinformation spreads, consumers will have an increasingly 
difficult time distinguishing what information is real and what is not.  
 
The consequences of targeted disinformation campaigns, also known as information warfare, are 
far-reaching. For example, purposefully dishonest news stories can lead to more emotional 
reactions among the public6. Disinformation efforts focus on exacerbating existing social and 
political cleavages within a society and thus have the potential to increase existing divisions7. 
The combination of social divisiveness, heightened emotional states, and a chaotic information 
landscape produced by disinformation makes instances of harassment and violence within 
targeted societies more likely8. Disinformation efforts, apart from increasing general discord 
within a targeted environment, also have the potential to harm personal reputations9, financial 
markets10, and public health11 12.  
 
                                                
4 Claire Wardle, “Information Disorder: The Essential Glossary,” First Draft. Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics, and Public 
Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2018, 
https://firstdraftnews.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/infoDisorder_glossary.pdf?x19860. 
 5 Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried, “Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2.0,” Atlantic Council, June 13, 2019, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/democratic-defense-against-disinformation-2-0/.  
6 Katie Langin, “Fake News Spreads Faster than True News on Twitter—Thanks to People, Not Bots,” Science, March 8, 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat5350.  
7 Lisa Reppell and Erica Shein, “Disinformation Campaigns and Hate Speech: Exploring the Relationship and Programming 
Interventions,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems, April 2019, 
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2019_ifes_disinformation_campaigns_and_hate_speech_briefing_paper.pdf.  
8 Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar's Military,” New York Times, October 15, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.  
9 Amanda Seitz, “NOT REAL NEWS: Anderson Cooper Didn't Fake Flood Broadcast,” AP NEWS, September 18, 2018, 
https://www.apnews.com/f1b624dc8154458d8c193d3d6be341de; “2019 Brand Disinformation Impact Study,” New Knowledge, 
January 2019, https://www.newknowledge.com/articles/2019-brand-disinformation-impact-study/.  
10 Max Fisher, “Syrian Hackers Claim AP Hack That Tipped Stock Market by $136 Billion. Is It Terrorism?,” Washington Post, 
April 23, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/syrian-hackers-claim-ap-hack-that-
tippedstock-market-by-136-billion-is-it-terrorism/.  
11 Marc Trotochaud and Matthew Watson, “Misinformation and Disinformation: An Increasingly Apparent Threat to Global 
Health Security,” The Bifurcated Needle, Center for Health Security, John Hopkins University, November 29, 2018, 
http://www.bifurcatedneedle.com/new-blog/2018/11/29/misinformation-and-disinformation-an-increasingly-apparent-threat-
toglobal-health-security.  
12 Emma Woollacott, “The Viral Spread Of Ebola Rumors,” Forbes, October 9, 2014, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2014/10/09/the-viral-spread-of-ebola-rumors/#191c27f219d8. 
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Targeted disinformation threatens democratic societies in particular. Democratic societies rely 
upon public support to advance policy initiatives13. Informed, rational, and civil debate is vital to 
form favorable public opinion, the lifeblood of democracy14. In a chaotic information landscape, 
such as that produced by targeted disinformation, rational discussion is made more difficult, 
leading to a decreased ability to build a public consensus and thus limiting the ability of 
democratic governments to enact meaningful change. Public opinion influences every area of 
government operation, including foreign policy. For example, it was public opinion that 
ultimately led to the withdrawal of US troops from the Vietnam War, rather than actual 
battlefield results15. 
 
Background of Russian Disinformation Efforts    
 
Governments of nation-states have always been interested in actively shaping public opinion. For 
instance, the British army utilized false news stories about the German military to form British 
public opinion during the First World War16. Also, Nazi Germany extensively tried to influence 
public opinion, of both their citizens and those of foreign countries, during the Second World 
War17. Additionally, and perhaps most pertinent to current US foreign policy, the Soviet Union 
utilized disinformation through tactics termed “active measures” against the west during the Cold 
War18.  
 
The Soviet strategy of active measures, which sought to control and influence the press and 
public opinion in pre-determined foreign countries, has long been a critical component of 
Russian foreign policy19. Efforts to spread disinformation have become a vital component 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Information warfare that utilizes targeted 
disinformation allows Russia to exert influence despite its reduced economic and military 
capabilities. Active measures were regarded as an “equalizer,” making up for hard-power 
weaknesses in comparison to western states20.  
 
During the Cold War, active measures were central to Soviet intelligence operations. These 
tactics of subversion were designed to weaken western democracies, drive wedges within 
                                                
13 Cheryl Boudreau and Scott A. Mackenzie, “Wanting What Is Fair: How Party Cues and Information about Income Inequality 
Affect Public Support for Taxes,” The Journal of Politics 80, no. 2 (2018): 367–81, https://doi.org/10.1086/694784.  
 14 Eggers, W.D., & O’Leary, J. (2009). If we can put a man on the moon….: Getting big things 
done in government (Chapter 3). Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. ISBN 1422166368.	
15 W.L. Lunch and P. W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” Political Research Quarterly 32, no. 1 
(January 1979): 21–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591297903200104; William M. Darley, “War Policy, Public Support, and the 
Media,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 2005, 121–34, 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/05summer/darley.pdf.  
16 Roy Greenslade, “First World War: How State and Press Kept Truth Off the Front Page,” The Guardian, July 27, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/27/first-world-war-state-press-reporting.  
17 Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, “The Nazis' Propaganda Trick: Invite the Public to Help Create an Alternate Reality,” Slate, March 
14, 2017, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/03/how-nazi-propaganda-encouraged-the-masses-to-co-produce-a-
falsereality.html.  
18 Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, “Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency 
Group Made a Major Difference (Strategic Perspectives, No. 11),” Strategic Perspectives, June 2012, 
https://doi.org/10.21236/ada577586.  
19 Abrams, S. (2016). Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia. Connections, 15(1), 5-31. 
20 DISINFORMATION: A PRIMER IN RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS. HEARING 
BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED 
FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION. (2017, March 30). Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm 
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domestic populations, and sow discord among western alliances21. Russian active measures, first 
utilized in World War I and continued throughout World War II and the Cold War, were used 
specifically to target western liberal democracies and the NATO alliance22. The manipulation of 
information environments was considered a cheap and effective strategy to harm western rivals 
and one that traditional military alliances had trouble defending23.  
 
Russian active measures have long been employed against the United States. One of the best-
known instances was the spread of disinformation about the AIDS epidemic in the US during the 
Cold War. False and conspiratorial news stories claiming that the US government manufactured 
and was responsible for the AIDS virus, ultimately spread their way into mainstream news 
coverage24. It is estimated that 10,000 different disinformation operations, involving 15,000 
operatives, were carried out by the Soviet Union during the Cold War25 26. Although the Cold 
War has ended, Russian active measures have not, and have given Russia a platform to further 
their foreign policy goals as western countermeasures have subsided27. 
 
Aspects of Modern Russian Disinformation Efforts 
 
As times have changed, the theme of targeted disinformation campaigns has not. During the Cold 
War, Russian disinformation efforts continue to sow discord through the use of issues that elicit 
fear, such as nuclear war, environmental catastrophe, and the collapse of the world economy28. 
This strategy relies on mass hysteria as its main motivational force, playing on the hopes and 
fears of those living in western liberal democracies29. Currently, this strategy is being used to 
undermine western democracies to further Russia’s foreign policy goals, such as the dissolution 
of NATO and the EU, as well as disrupt free and fair democratic elections, most notably in 
Germany, France, and the United States30. 
 
Current disinformation efforts aim to attack western liberal societies through citizens’ 
relationships with their democratic institutions31. The main goal is for the information 
environment in democratic societies to be too confusing for ordinary consumers to accurately 
                                                
21 O1eg Kalugin, "Inside the KGB: An interview with retired KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin," CNN, January J998.  
22 Roy Godson, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm 
23 Report of the Senate Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference 
in the 2016 U.S. Election. Volume 2: Russia's Use of Social Media. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf 
24 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive & the Secret History of the 
KGB, Basic Booksi 1985, p. 244.  
25 Thomas Rid, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://www.intelligence.senate~gov/hearings/open.  
26 Dr. Roy Godson, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm 
27 Dr. Roy Godson, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm 
28 Abrams, S. (2016). Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia. Connections, 15(1), 5-31. 
29 Abrams, S. (2016). Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia. Connections, 15(1), 5-31. 
30 Dr. Eugene Rumer, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm 
31 Report of the Senate Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference 
in the 2016 U.S. Election. Volume 2: Russia's Use of Social Media. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf 
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identify the truth of an issue32. This strategy looks not to directly convince or persuade, instead to 
distract and confuse, to increase distrust toward traditional media outlets and democratic 
institutions33.  
 
As with disinformation strategies employed during the Cold War, efforts are unconstrained by a 
particular ideology or viewpoint34. Throughout the world, disinformation efforts to exacerbate 
divides and create echo chambers of support favorable to Russian foreign policy positions are in 
effect. For instance, this strategy has been employed following the downing of Malaysian 
Airlines Flight 17 in Ukraine, chemical attacks in Syria, and the poisoning of intelligence 
operatives in England, all efforts utilizing both far-left and far-right messaging35. 
 
From Russia’s perspective, the world has entered a second Cold War period that is being fought 
through the manipulation of information. Rather than create new divisions within a society, 
Russian active measures look to exploit ones that already exist with the hope of exacerbating 
existing weaknesses, increasing polarization, and overall increasing vulnerability36. According to 
experts on the information warfare frontlines, there are multiple long-term goals of modern 
Russian disinformation efforts37. These goals are to undermine citizen confidence and erode trust 
in democratic institutions, exacerbate divisive political fissures, popularize Russian foreign 
policy agendas, and create general distrust, confusion, and chaos – ultimately blurring the lines 
between fiction and reality.    
 
Use of Social Media 
 
Before the internet, Russian active measures sought to produce and spread disinformation 
through more traditional means. Early efforts were often carried out by individual actors on the 
ground, bringing with them higher risks and time inefficiencies38. However, targeted 
disinformation tactics have been updated by the introduction of the internet and social media. 
Russia has utilized the internet, in particular social media platforms, to effectively wage 
information warfare. Online social media platforms provide Russia with cheap, efficient, and 
effective access to foreign audiences while being able to deny any official involvement in a 
believable manner39.  
 
                                                
32 Joby Warrick and Anton Troianovski, "Agents of doubt," Washington Post, December 10, 2018.  
33 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, "The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and 
Money," Institut~ of Modern Russia, 2014, https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_ Weiss_ and _Peter_Pomerantsev 
_The_ Menace_ of_ Unreality.pdf.  
34 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, "The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and 
Money," Institut~ of Modern Russia, 2014, https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_ Weiss_ and _Peter_Pomerantsev 
_The_ Menace_ of_ Unreality.pdf. 	
35 Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer, et al., "Information Manipulation: A Challenge for our Democracies," Policy Planning 
Staff(CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) of the Ministry for 
the Armed Forces, Paris, August 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdli'information _manipulation_ rvb _ cle83 
8736.pdf.  
36 Thomas Rid, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee. on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https:1/www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open.  
37 Clint Watts, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm 
38 Abrams, S. (2016). Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia. Connections, 15(1), 5-31. 
39 Clint Watts, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://viww.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open.  
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Russian online efforts began domestically in the mid-2000s to suppress political opposition and 
have since turned toward western liberal democracies40. The impact of disinformation 
disseminated through social media platforms on democratic systems, especially ones with 
existing social divisions, is the main threat posed by disinformation campaigns41. Russia has 
become adept at identifying and influencing democratic elections, in particular, choosing close 
political contests where slight influences and stoking of existing tensions can have the most 
significant impact. For instance, in the 2016 US presidential campaign, alt-right audiences angry 
about immigration, automation, and economic hardship were prominently targeted for influence 
through social media42.  
 
The ability for Russian active measures to utilize social media platforms to spread false and 
damaging narratives has come with the rise of public internet use. The growth of public reliance 
on the internet and social media to obtain information has been steep, and will only continue. 
Following an explosion of interconnectivity, Wi-Fi, and smartphone use, social media platforms 
have become a primary source for news gathering around the world43. In general, younger people 
are relying less on television and more on social media for information and newsgathering. 
Currently, the evidence suggests that 68% of Americans get news from social media sources, and 
43% of Americans get news directly from Facebook44 45. Further, less than 38% relied on print 
media for news46.  
 
The capacity for users to share information online easily and quickly without the need to verify 
accuracy makes these platforms especially susceptible to targeted disinformation campaigns47 
48. As a result, 23% of Americans have inadvertently shared fake news online49. The inherent 
mechanisms of the internet provide disinformation actors with a great advantage. Tools such as 
account anonymity, unlimited audience access, low cost, and plausible deniability make targeted 
disinformation efforts exceedingly efficient and effective50.  
 
According to disinformation experts within the US intelligence community, social media 
                                                
40 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, "Russia's Approach to Cyber Warfare," CNA Analysis and Solutions, Occasional Paper 
Series, March 2017.  
41 Clint Watts, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 30, 2017, available at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25362/html/CHRG-115shrg25362.htm 
42 Weisburd, A., Watts, C., & Berger, J. M. (2016). Trolling for Trump: How Russia is trying to destroy our democracy. War on 
the Rocks, 6.	
43 “The Mobile Economy 2018,” GSM Association, 2018, 
https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/The-Mobile-Economy-Global-2018.pdf. 
44 “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018,” Pew Research Center, September 12, 2018, 
https://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2018/. 
45 A.W. Geiger, “Key Findings about the Online News Landscape in America,” Pew Research Center, September 11, 2019, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/11/key-findings-about-the-online-news-landscape-in-america/.  
46 Elisa Shearer, “Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source,” Pew Research Center, December 10, 
2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/. 
47 Paul Oliver, “The State of Disinformation on Social Media,” NYU Center for Data Science, April 23, 2018, 
https://medium.com/center-for-data-science/the-state-of-disinformation-on-social-media-397d3c30f56a.   
48 Mike Wood, “How Does Misinformation Spread Online?,” Psychology Today, December 6, 2018, 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/web-mistrust/201812/how-does-misinformation-spread-online.   
49 Denise-Marie Ordway, “Fake News and the Spread of Misinformation,” Journalist's Resource, September 1, 2017, 
https://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/internet/fake-news-conspiracy-theories-journalism-research/.  
50 Weisburd, A., Watts, C., & Berger, J. M. (2016). Trolling for Trump: How Russia is trying to destroy our democracy. War on 
the Rocks, 6. 
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increases the power of disinformation efforts in five key ways51. First, the insight into 
relationships and interests that social media provides, given the high number of individuals who 
place their data there, allow disinformation actors to target a particular audience efficiently and 
accurately. Second, online platforms provide the ability to create accounts anonymously, giving 
a place to effectively host content that can reach millions of people and the ability for official 
government actors to deny any involvement. Then, online platform algorithms can be 
manipulated through statistical inflation, mainly through the use of bots and strategically placed 
human-operated accounts, increasing the chances of disinformation being spread by innocent 
bystanders and seeping into the general public conversation. 
 
If It Trends, It Becomes True 
 
The revenue model of online platforms produces specific mechanisms that foreign 
disinformation actors can exploit. The issue of targeted disinformation campaigns is not a truth 
of information problem. Instead, it is a system manipulation problem52. Social media platforms 
offer uncensored communication channels that do not require an intermediary between creators 
and consumers53. The ease with which individuals can communicate provides an excellent outlet 
for free-speech. However, nefarious and insidious actors looking to cause damage can take 
advantage also.  
 
There is a trade-off for the low barrier of entry. In exchange for free access, platform owners can 
freely gather user data, enabling advertisers and platforms to share content with specific users 
that conforms to their determined interests, sparing consumers from seeing content that they are 
not passionate about. Online platforms use customer data to study behavior to learn how to 
maximize a user’s time spent online, increasing the effectiveness of targeted advertising and 
overall revenue generation54. 
 
Modern disinformation warfare is computationally driven and enhanced by the revenue models 
of online social media platforms. Platforms gain revenue from attention, such as clicks and 
shares, and have become experts at utilizing the attention of users. Platforms employ algorithms 
to show content to users for which they express a predisposition. This mechanism is a tool for 
propagandists. A piece of content, authentic or otherwise, can reach and influence a broad 
audience if it gains enough momentum through online platform algorithms. In other words, once 
something has trended, it can become real55. 
 
                                                
51 Clint Watts, Statement Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism: 
“Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions.”, October 31, 2017. Retrieved 
from https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-31-17 Watts Testimony.pdf 
52 Renee Diresta, Statement for the record from Renee DiResta, Director of Research, New Knowledge, October 1, 2018. 
Retrieved from https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-rdiresta-080118.pdf 
53 “Indicators of News Media,” Gallup, Inc., 2018, https://kf-site-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/000/000/216/original/KnightFoundation_Panel4_Trust_Indicators_FINAL.p
df.  
54 Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns: A Whole-of-Society Issue, October, 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ia/ia_combatting-targeted-disinformation-campaigns.pdf 
55 Renée DiResta, “Computational Propaganda: If You Make It Trend, You Make It True,” The Yale Review, October 12, 2018, 
https://yalereview.yale.edu/computational-propaganda.   
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Once a piece of content is trending, it gains legitimacy, especially in the eyes of sympathetic 
users. This process means that disinformation actors must simply amplify a false narrative to 
earn a certain amount of momentum and popularity to give it the appearance of truth, and thus 
influence over a target audience56. Online platforms have an incentive to utilize user data in this 
manner and display content that conforms to personal interests, increasing the revenue generated 
by selling online advertisements57. Here, the more alluring the content, the longer the time spent 
on a platform, and the higher the potential profit58.  
 
 
 
Within the scientific literature, two particular aspects inherent to online and social media 
platforms exacerbate the impact of disinformation efforts. The echo chamber phenomenon and 
homophilous sorting. First, online echo chambers are formed where users become more likely to 
see and interact with content that agrees with their worldview. Online platforms feed users what 
they want to know, not necessarily what they ought to know59. Platform search algorithms 
provide results tied to prior behavior, meaning content viewed will likely conform to a user’s 
pre-existing biases, seeming more credible than content that does not60. Credibility is gained, 
especially with emotionally compelling information, as the emotional appeal of information will 
connect a user more strongly and outweigh one’s interest in trustworthiness61. 
 
Second, going hand in hand with the formation of echo chambers is homophilous sorting. 
Homophilous sorting is the propensity of individuals who share the same perspective to form 
close-minded groups with one another62. The internet and social media have been shown to 
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encourage the grouping together of like-minded individuals63 64 65. Search functions and online 
platform algorithms show users content that reinforces their previously held beliefs based on 
their history66. Homophilous sorting creates niches on online platforms where individuals 
become less likely to be exposed to information that challenges their perspectives67. As biases 
and prejudices are endlessly reinforced through personalized news feeds, individuals hear only 
their own opinion and have the ability to restrict themselves to only their point of view68. Due to 
these mechanisms of online platforms, ideological boundaries are rarely crossed. For instance, 
those who discuss political issues with others who share their perspective are more likely to end 
up in more extreme ideological positions69. 
  
Wired for Manipulation  
 
The mechanisms of online communication platforms do not merge well with the human brain. In 
an already muddied and overwhelming information ecosystem, particular facts of how the human 
brain operates highlight just how vulnerable targeted populations are to information warfare. 
Individual concepts can illustrate how rational decision-making falters in the face of 
overwhelming amounts of information. The first concept is the majority illusion. 
 
A majority illusion is created as a result of computational propaganda70. Here, particular 
members within a social network can give the appearance that an idea, opinion, or product is 
more popular than it is 71. The more a piece of content is inflated statistically through the 
exploitation of social media algorithms, the more likely real people are to believe its credibility. 
In other words, the more attention something has, the more it has trended, the more truthful it 
looks to the human brain. When the information landscape is muddied, and the truth is 
indistinguishable from fiction in many areas, individuals resort to trusting information that 
supports their personal biases and preferences, especially the higher its popularity72.  
 
The second concept aiding disinformation actors is the vast array of confirmation biases that 
exacerbate the echo chamber phenomenon73. Confirmation bias is where individuals give 
unequal attention and weight to information that supports their position. As a result, individuals 
seek and interpret evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs. Personalized news feeds 
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give aid to these unconscious forces and only increase one’s selectiveness. Further, motivated 
skepticism is a concept which states that individuals tend to end up with more extreme positions 
after seeking out dissimilar information74. This effect causes individuals to evaluate similar 
arguments to their own higher than ones that are not. As with confirmation biases, social media 
algorithms exacerbate this concept by actively presenting users with arguments corresponding to 
their point of view. In the case of disinformation, as targeted individuals receive false narratives 
through the exploitation of online algorithms, this information can solidify incendiary ideological 
positions, decreasing civility as a result and causing overall harm to a democratic society.   
 
Prior beliefs significantly impact individuals’ evaluation of evidence, and humans will take 
advantage of opportunities to be selective. Humans are wired to limit their exposure to situations 
in which personal views may be threatened, and are more likely to select the information that 
conforms to their previously held social goals and beliefs75. For example, individuals are more 
likely to remember and believe the first sources of information they receive on a divisive 
topic76. Due to how crucial first impressions are to the recall and internalization of information, 
disinformation actors can quickly introduce and amplify narrative-shaping content on sensational 
issues to powerful effect. 
 
Predispositions account for a large portion of individuals’ overall information consumption77. 
For instance, individual preferences for newspaper content are related to one’s sex, race, and 
level of education78. These preferences have also been shown regarding the selection of online 
news topics79. Additional research has demonstrated that individuals are more willing to choose 
online news outlets and news stories that run parallel to their ideological leanings80 81.  
 
Further, an underlying factor is that emotions, rather than rationality, hold influence on human 
day-to-day decision making82. The fact that emotionality is more pervasive than rationality is 
evident from recent studies that examined voter allegiances in the 2016 US electoral campaign83. 
These studies provide support for the fact that it takes far more than mere facts and logic to 
change someone’s mind. This difficulty is due to a tension in the brain between responding to 
new information and resisting overwhelming amounts of conflicting data84. The pressure here is 
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enough to prevent opinion change altogether in the event of information overload. The internet 
and social media are home to overwhelming amounts of opinions and information, leading to 
information overload, only heightening this neurological phenomenon. 
 
Additional evidence suggests that decision making regarding opinion change takes place in the 
self-reference section of the brain85. More specifically, opinion formation occurs through the 
construction of personal narratives that persist in the face of conflicting information. Paying 
attention to details that one would typically ignore floods the brain with contradictory 
information, and delusions are the brain’s adaptation to facing this uncertainty. Misconceptions 
of this manner are primarily a survival mechanism86. In life-threatening situations, decisions 
need to be made quickly in the face of overwhelming amounts of conflicting data. Therefore, 
there is a trade-off between accuracy and speed in the brain. 
 
Humans make decisions based on constructed narratives of self-reference. Once a decision has 
been made, the brain plays catch-up. Further evidence has supported the idea that decisions are 
prepared before the brain has fully processed all information87. This evidence is supported 
further regarding opinions held on issues ties to community values, such as abortion and gun 
rights88. Individuals tend to moderate their views on these issues as they are forced to explain the 
mechanisms behind their position. However, this does not hold for community value-based 
issues. Instead, opinion change for these issues hinges on one-to-one in-person conversations that 
help individuals relate to the group in question89.   
 
False narratives strategically spread and then amplified through social media can have an 
immense and destructive impact as a result. Foreign actors can utilize sensitive issues, such as 
race-relations or other issues tied to community values like abortion and gun rights, to spread 
disinformation effectively. Once false narratives successfully gather momentum, they will 
influence and drive individuals within particular communities toward harmful conclusions based 
on incorrect information that drives fear, anger, and discontent, weakening society and 
increasing polarization and distrust as a result. 
 
Model of Targeted Disinformation  
 
Foreign actors using modern disinformation tactics utilize a particular model to accomplish their 
foreign policy goals and produce chaos by spreading incendiary and false narratives within a 
target audience. These efforts look to first effectively create disinformation suitable for a 
particular target audience. Actors then use content amplification techniques through online social 
media platform algorithms to ensure a direct impact on an unwitting target audience. 
Specifically, intelligence experts at the center of combatting foreign targeted disinformation 
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warfare have highlighted five steps that threat actors use: create, push, share, discuss, and 
challenge90.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Create 
 
Foreign disinformation actors create content to target specific audiences, picking up on already 
divisive themes91. An actor will first seek to analyze the target audience, determine how 
information flows through the target environment, and identify which societal fissures to 
exploit92. In this first stage, Russian disinformation efforts, in particular, use a blend of overt and 
covert operations. First, hacking and obtaining sensitive data that highlights relevant 
characteristics of a target audience, followed by spreading false narratives through the use of 
captured user data, often initially through state-funded online media sources93.   
 
The messaging topics of created content can be political, financial, or social. Social messages 
promote fear of global calamity and the collapse of the western liberal order, while political 
messages are designed to undermine political leaders and institutions94. Financial messages look 
to weaken confidence and trust in the free market95. Social messages are particularly dangerous 
because they pick up on divisive social issues easily gathered through user data on online social 
media platforms. This messaging looks to exacerbate social tensions and undermine the social 
fabric of society by promoting fear, discord, and distrust in the status quo96.  
 
After false and misleading content is created, a campaign is launched to deliver content to initial 
seeding locations such as online forums or social media platforms97. Delivery to these sources 
sets the stage, creating the illusion that there are multiple sources for a particular story. Written 
articles, blog posts, and social media posts are created as references, adding momentum to 
previously concocted false news stories. Here, operatives are performing what is known as 
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“information laundering,” or adding legitimacy to disinformation by discussing it, ultimately 
laying the groundwork for further spread and amplification98.  
 
Push 
 
The second step is to amplify created content that supports false narratives. The manipulation of 
online social media platforms sharing functions and revenue generation algorithms pushes 
disinformation into mainstream conversations99. Strategic online social media accounts and 
“bots” work to amplify the number of views a piece of content receives. The idea is to earn the 
attention of a significant number of unwitting members of a target audience, and even members 
of the mainstream media100.  
 
Automated accounts, or “bots,” are an essential aspect of pushing disinformation into the 
communication channels of a target audience. Bots are computer algorithms designed to execute 
specific online tasks autonomously and repetitively. By simulating the behavior of human actors 
in social networks, they can believably and strategically interact with others and share 
information on social media101. These social media automated accounts allow disinformation 
actors to easily amplify and spread content, creating the illusion of popularity, and thus add to its 
legitimacy. Altogether, 190 million automated accounts on social media platforms existed to 
amplify disinformation leading up to the 2016 US presidential election, more than half the 
population of the United States102. Overall, it is estimated that 45 percent of Russia’s current 
activity on Twitter is through mostly automated accounts103.  
 
Modern foreign-backed disinformation efforts utilize every popular social media platform, such 
as Instagram, Reddit, YouTube, Tumblr, 4chan, and Pinterest104.  Disinformation operatives use 
social media to spread disinformation and operate under two main principles: high volume and 
multiple channels. Threat actors use a wide variety of online methods to create a “fire hose of 
falsehood” through the sheer volume of false content spread to targeted audiences through a wide 
variety of channels105. High volume and repetition of disinformation messaging on a wide range 
of platforms flood the information landscape to overwhelm a target audience106.  
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Additionally, speed is vital to modern disinformation efforts. Due to the importance of first 
impressions on the human mind, the rate of spread can have a significant effect on the influence 
of misleading content that discusses a sensitive, community-value based issue. Also, the sooner 
that false information seeps into a target audience, the more influential it becomes, and the more 
difficult it is to debunk given the slow decision-making apparatuses in western liberal 
democracies107. For instance, Russian active measures were being employed within hours of the 
downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, spreading conspiracy theories and false 
narrative surrounding the downing of the plane to benefit Russian interests108.    
 
Share and Discuss  
 
As purposefully false information is pushed into the information ecosystem of a targeted 
audience, false narratives are further spread by domestic voices, adding to the illusion that a false 
narrative is legitimate. Individuals sympathetic to the interests of foreign actors, and covert 
social media accounts operated by foreign operatives discuss and share malicious content to 
make unwitting Americans feel as though improbable information is part of a legitimate 
conversation109. Here, there is a substantial reliance on “useful idiots” or unwitting Americans 
who pick up on and discuss false narratives110. Unwitting agents, such as useful idiots, are 
perceived to be sympathetic to an actor’s cause but do not comprehend the objectives of their 
campaign. These innocent bystanders ultimately spread disinformation without knowing they are 
actively participating in information warfare111. Also, foreign operative-controlled online 
accounts will look to share incorrect information with key public figures in the online 
information space. These vital public figures will sympathize with a particular inflammatory 
viewpoint, have legitimate influence in some capacity, and carry a substantial online 
following112. 
 
A disinformation actor needs to control the effect of a false narrative and manipulate the reaction 
of a target audience. This control is gained through the infiltration of public online conversations, 
inciting conflict, and strengthening the illusion of consensus by trolling comment sections of 
online posts113. “Trolls” and covert operatives, backed by foreign actors, use online platforms to 
discuss content that connects with real people in the target audience. This organic connection is a 
vital pillar of disinformation efforts. Attraction and exploitation of real individuals in the target 
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audience to “retweet” or spread content, or even to host events in the real world, is a primary 
goal of targeted disinformation campaigns114. 
 
Challenge  
 
Lastly, false personas on online platforms look to heckle and troll to create confusion and chaos, 
making truth increasingly indistinguishable from fiction115. These “trolls” seek to stifle 
democratic debate online, overwhelming social media users with a glut of false information that 
works to promote doubt and paranoia116.  “Trolling” is a prominent aspect of targeted 
disinformation campaigns. A “troll” is a real person who spreads inflammatory, aggressive, 
harassing, and misleading messages on online platforms to provoke emotional responses from 
other users of social media117.  To advance the goals of disinformation operations, Russia has 
built trolling operations on an industrial scale, spreading disinformation and stoking emotional 
reactions both domestically and abroad118. For instance, Russian trolls have been hard at work 
for years, undermining political opposition to Vladimir Putin and supporting those who hold 
positions that align with Russian foreign policy aims119. During the onset of the conflict in 
Ukraine, Russian backed trolls aggressively attacked those with views opposite to Russian goals 
with offensive slurs, utilization of sarcasm, promoting false information with indigestible 
amounts of unsourced data, and overall seeking to emphasize and capitalize on social 
divisions120. 
 
Case Study – Russian Interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
Leading up to and during the 2016 US presidential election, Russia conducted a targeted 
disinformation campaign to interfere with and undermine the American democratic system. 
Russian efforts were carried out through a privately contracted group called the Internet 
Research Agency (IRA), which was financially backed by the Kremlin121 122. The IRA, at the 
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behest of the Kremlin since 2013, looked to influence the 2016 presidential election by 
exacerbating existing societal tension123 124.  
	
The IRA operated like an assembly line, generating false and misleading content on an industrial 
scale125. The IRA functioned like any stable PR or marketing organization would, making 
strategic business-like moves designed to reach as many people as possible126. In 2016, the IRA 
sought to impact the primary process for both parties directly, potentially ruining the hopes of 
candidates more hostile to Russian interests127. Recently, other initiatives to influence the 
democratic process have been used by Russia in places such as Syria and Ukraine128.  
 
Efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election were part of a much broader campaign to 
harm the United States and western democracies. IRA efforts were one component of a 
comprehensive and sophisticated information warfare strategy to fuel discord and discontent in 
western democratic politics and society129. These recent and ongoing efforts do not obsess with 
the outcome of a single election. Instead, it is the downfall of the electoral system that is 
desired130. Undermining public faith in democracy and interfering with political conversations in 
western liberal states was the central goal during the run-up to the 2016 US presidential 
election131. 
 
With that overarching goal in mind, in 2016, the IRA engaged in a social media campaign 
designed to provoke and amplify social and political discord within the United States132. Russia’s 
funding for the IRA was part of a more extensive information warfare operation entitled “Project 
Lakhta,” to spread disinformation both within Russia and abroad133. IRA efforts to amplify false 
content, promote discord and divisiveness among targeted populations, and engage unwitting 
Americans are visible leading up to the 2016 US presidential election.  
 
Create  
 
First, the IRA would create fake, yet organic-looking, social media accounts, and online websites 
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run by IRA employees to produce false and misleading content134. These fraudulent accounts and 
online sites would believably claim to be associated with US political and grassroots 
organizations, posing as groups with strong views on relevant and sensitive political and social 
issues in the United States135. Often, false narratives would be quickly picked up by Russian state 
media outlets such as Russia Today (RT). RT is Russia’s foremost state-sponsored news 
organization and a propaganda vehicle of choice for the Russian government. RT created 
content, mainly disseminated through YouTube, has been viewed over five billion times and is a 
means to develop and pick up on other false narratives that have been concocted136. 
 
Overall, IRA efforts may have reached as many as 126 million people during the time leading up 
to and immediately following the 2016 election137. For instance, 81 Facebook pages associated 
with the IRA, followed by 3.3 million Americans, created 60,000 organic posts during this 
time138. In September of 2016 alone, around 1,000 pieces of IRA content were created weekly, 
reaching an estimated 20 to 30 million Americans139. These efforts, while centered around the 
time frame of the 2016 election, looked to accomplish more than influencing the election. Very 
little of the content created was in direct reference to any particular candidate140. Instead, IRA 
efforts showed a sophisticated understanding of American psychology, and where the rawest 
social sensitivities of the American political debate lied141.  
	
To help gain this understanding, the IRA sent a group of agents to America to determine divisive 
and exploitable social issues and talking points142. Agents ultimately picked up on sensitive 
topics such as race and religion that would become the focus of future efforts. Misleading 
content created on social media discussed these inflammatory subjects and sought to amplify 
divisive rhetoric and increase the polarity of political narratives143. Further, Russian intelligence 
services were able to exploit online social media platforms and hack into sensitive materials, 
providing further ammunition144. For instance, it was emails stolen by Russian intelligence 
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services that initiated the WikiLeaks publication just before the 2016 US presidential election145.  
 
These efforts are part of a broader operation to track and study the online activity of Americans 
and better understand the political and social divisions within the United States. IRA employees 
made strides to contact unwitting individuals in the US to refine information warfare tactics and 
targets. For instance, IRA operatives posed as Americans and spoke with specific grassroots 
organizations and learned to focus disinformation efforts on “purple” states, or states with 
ideological flexibility, such as Colorado, Virginia, and Florida146. Content material, social media 
account names, and specific target audiences reflect IRA efforts to research and exploit existing 
tensions, ultimately picking up on divisive social issues such as race, immigration, and the 
Second Amendment147. IRA operatives created content on IRA-run accounts that looked to 
capitalize on these hot-button societal divisions and stoke anger, provoke outrage and protest, 
increase distrust in government institutions, and ultimately push American citizens further away 
from one another.  
 
IRA content creators would receive a list of “technical tasks” at the beginning of each workday 
that revolved around divisive themes and the latest news stories148. On relevant topics, IRA 
content creators were instructed to create “political intensity” by supporting radical groups and 
users that felt dissatisfied and discontented with current situations, and the political and social 
landscape in general149. IRA content creation activity would increase around campaign and 
elections events such as presidential debates and party conventions150. Efforts would also 
increase in response to real-world events, such as Hilary Clinton’s physical collapse at the World 
Trade Center memorial while on the campaign trail151.  
	
Race and race-related issues were the primary targets of Russian disinformation efforts to sow 
discord and divide the US in 2016152. No single group of Americans was targeted by the IRA 
more than African-Americans. For instance, 66 percent of advertising done by the IRA on 
Facebook was concerned with topics related to race and was explicitly aimed at metro areas with 
high African American populations153. Also, the top-performing IRA operated Facebook page 
was centered on race-related issues, generating over 11 million engagements154.   
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Push 
 
The IRA, financed by Russian shell companies, worked to spread disinformation into indigenous 
audiences pre-determined to be susceptible to messaging on a specific topic155. Once created 
content is pushed into information circles, it becomes increasingly difficult to disprove. 
Successful IRA efforts weaved malicious narratives into regular conversations, even attracting 
high profile individuals to push false stories even further. For instance, high-profile individuals 
in the US, such as Roger Stone, Sean Hannity, and Donald Trump Jr., unwittingly spread content 
created by the IRA leading up to the 2016 election, undoubtedly growing the IRA’s audience as 
a result156.  
 
A primary method that the IRA used to push disinformation was targeted online advertising. 
Over the two years leading up to the 2016 election, the IRA spent a total of $100,000 on targeted 
advertisements157. These advertisements reached out to specific populations, mostly in swing 
states, and primarily concerned incendiary and divisive political and social issues such as race, 
sexuality, gender, immigration, and Second Amendment rights. Most targeted advertisements 
encouraged social media users, particularly on Facebook, to follow IRA-created pages dedicated 
to these inflammatory issues. As audiences were drawn in from targeted advertising, organic 
content could directly entice those sympathetic to the theme of an IRA source. The IRA 
purchased around 3,400 Facebook and Instagram advertisements that were seen by an estimated 
11.4 million Americans158. 
	
Another asset to the IRA is social media platform algorithms that are designed to recommend 
appropriate content to users that correspond to their interests. IRA created content, taking 
advantage of computational algorithms, was recommended to people following similar pages or 
who had viewed related content, making it relatively simple to spread falsehoods across a 
specific target audience159. IRA operatives utilized the mechanisms of online platforms to 
enhance the effectiveness of their operations precisely as they were engineered to be used. For 
instance, the IRA could use Facebook’s geographic targeting feature to pump advertisements 
down to a specific state, city, neighborhood, or university160.  
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Due to the speed and reach that it provides, Twitter is a particularly useful platform for pushing 
disinformation. Original content, primarily created on platforms such as Facebook and 
Instagram, was pushed out mainly through Twitter to vulnerable target audiences161. The sheer 
volume of posting and ease of spreading information via the “retweet” function assisted in 
reaching large amounts of people and obscuring the source and motivation for a particular false 
narrative162. The volume of IRA Twitter posts leading up to the 2016 election was 
overwhelming, averaging around 50,000 tweets per month163. Twitter eventually uncovered over 
3,800 accounts related to the IRA, which generated approximately 8.5 million tweets with 72 
million user engagements164.   
 
The use of automated accounts, or “bots,” was heavily utilized on Twitter. This tool gave the 
IRA an ability to amplify and push out disinformation by inflating the popularity and reach of a 
post through the manipulation of the “retweet” function165. Content promoting false narratives 
would become popular than it was, increasing its ability to reach a target audience and appear as 
a genuine piece of credible information166. Twitter uncovered over 50,000 automated accounts 
tied to Russian disinformation efforts around the 2016 US presidential election167.  
	
One example of successful IRA efforts to push dishonest content on Twitter is the case of a fake 
Twitter account claiming to be related to the Republican Party in Tennessee. This phony account 
accumulated over 150,000 followers by the time it was shut down in 2017, and worked to push 
false and divisive content into the political mainstream during the run-up to the general 
election168. False narratives promoted from this account and amplified through the coordinated 
use of bots, found its way into the US mainstream media. For instance, content originating from 
the account was interacted with and spread by multiple individuals associated with the Trump 
campaign, such as Donald Trump Jr., Kellyanne Conway, and General Michael Flynn169. 
Eventually, content would appear in mainstream outlets such as the BBC, USA Today, and The 
Huffington Post170. Once content had been created and amplified into a target audience, and then 
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filtered into the mainstream media sources, it becomes nearly impossible to stop and has already 
accomplished its primary objective171. 
 
Share and Discuss  
 
IRA operations then turned to more involved interaction with target audiences. Overall, IRA 
operatives look to stoke emotional reactions on inflammatory issues by weaving false, malicious 
narratives into the consciousness of unsuspecting members of the public. Once accomplished, 
members of a target audience will spread fake stories on their own, strengthening the illusion that 
disinformation on divisive social and political issues was accurate. 
 
Leading up to the 2016 US presidential election, IRA employees operating false accounts 
worked to engage and increase public interaction with misleading content. IRA employees were 
tasked with creating and maintaining fake, yet believable online personas to seed false narratives 
into normal day-to-day online activities172. These personas looked to inflate audience 
participation, attract similarly-minded individuals, and then use divisive rhetoric to stoke 
negative emotions from the curated audience173. These IRA content administrators would portray 
themselves as proponents and advocates on an assortment of sensitive social issues such as 
immigration, Second Amendment rights, police brutality, race, and sexuality, both from left-
wing and right-wing perspectives174.  
 
False accounts were successfully woven into the political discourse of the US during the 2016 
election, gaining influence, engaging, manipulating, and radicalizing members of targeted online 
communities175. The IRA had an estimated 400 employees interacting with malicious content 
created by IRA pages176. IRA employees posted an average of 50 times per day and were 
expected to maintain a certain number of followers and level of audience interaction177. 
Operatives would make efforts to establish credibility with like-minded users by occasionally 
making detailed, innocuous, character-building posts, waiting for the opportune time to deliver 
inflammatory content. The objective was to weave propaganda into what appeared to be the 
everyday conversation of an ordinary American178. Publishing factual information increased the 
chance that audience members would take a phony account seriously, and increase the potency 
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of divisive content179.  
	
Additionally, the IRA, using false personas, would communicate with unwitting Americans and 
convince them to engage in offline activities180. The IRA would seek to persuade individuals to 
deepen their engagement with IRA operatives to create, organize, and promote real-life events 
such as political rallies181. Posing as grassroots activists, primarily on Facebook, IRA operatives 
would often organize two opposing ideological groups to come together at similar times and 
places to create images of conflict, generating opinions that the US was engulfed in racial and 
political strife182. At least 130 events were promoted and organized online as a result of IRA 
activity, and over 300,000 Facebook users engaged with content promoting these physical 
events183. Organizing physical events was Russia’s way of arming opposing sides in an attempt 
to create civil conflict184. 
 
Organizing efforts primarily targeted African-American populations and hoped to develop and 
recruit particular individuals as assets185. IRA efforts sought to influence targeted individuals to 
sign petitions, stage events, and share personal information186. For instance, an IRA operated 
Facebook page called “Black4Black” got unaware businesses within the African-American 
community of Cleveland, Ohio, to give out personal information that would benefit IRA efforts 
in exchange for free promotion on social media187. Also, an IRA page called “BlackFist” was 
able to organize and fund a self-defense program for African-Americans in local parks188.  
 
Inciting political events and protest through social media became a central focus of IRA efforts 
leading up to the 2016 election189. During this period, the IRA would spend almost $100,000 
supporting activists to organize 400 different protests and events across the United States190. An 
example of the IRA’s commitment to insight negative emotions on inflammatory political and 
social issues can be seen in a real-world event organized by IRA operatives through Facebook in 
May of 2016. Here, IRA operatives, using Facebook’s targeted advertising feature, manipulated 
anti-Muslimism groups through a right-wing Facebook page with a quarter of a million followers 
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to organize an event called “Stop the Islamization of Texas.” 191 On the opposing side, IRA 
operatives used the same means to arrange a similar event through the “United Muslims for 
America” Facebook group. The events organized by the IRA took place at the same time and 
place as each other in Houston, Texas. At the cost of just $200, the IRA organized events 
resulted in a physical confrontation and verbal abuse that was picked up and spread widely by 
local news agencies192. 
 
Challenge  
 
Following election day in 2016, IRA activity would increase. IRA controlled accounts remained 
highly active and produced more than a million tweets on a typical day193. After content had 
been created, amplified, and effectively shared with target audiences, the IRA, using false 
personas, worked to interact with target audiences, further stoking emotional responses on 
inflammatory issues. Long after the 2016 presidential election, IRA operatives would 
simultaneously take polar opposite sides of an argument to play unwitting members of a target 
audience off of each other194.    
 
IRA “trolls” would monitor societal divisions and were ready to react when new events provoked 
unrest195. For instance, when NFL players began kneeling for the national anthem in the United 
States, IRA operatives took to social media for comment, appearing to represent both left and 
right sides of the ideological spectrum, spewing inflammatory content to galvanize like-minded 
supporters and fuel negative emotions196. Those performing this role within the IRA were taught 
how to comment on social media platforms without being detected, blocked, or removed 
altogether197. For instance, IRA trolls commenting on divisive issues were taught not to mention 
anything directly related to Russia or Vladimir Putin198. The goal was not to convince Americans 
of Russian foreign policy positions directly; it was to turn Americans against their government, 
digging up feelings of anger and discontent. 
 
The IRA used their well-trained understanding of chasms in American discourse, such as 
taxation, race, gender and LGBT rights, and the Second Amendment, to “rock the boat” and 
increase polarization199. Understanding the American political environment is critical for the IRA 
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trolling operation. IRA operatives would examine thousands of comments to gain a better 
understanding of trends and language used before strategically posting content that would look at 
home in a particular social media thread200. IRA trolls were paid based on their ability to 
maintain these real-looking personas on social media, and their ability to effectively attack and 
defend both sides of relevant issues such as race relations201.  
 
Russia’s ability to play different ideological positions off of each other was a critical component 
of their strategy. For instance, following the 2016 election, IRA efforts shifted from focusing on 
provoking members of the far-Right, to stirring anti-Trump sentiment on the far-Left202. As 
Russian efforts to influence the 2020 election ramp up203, it may be misguided to characterize 
those efforts in a way that makes it look like a pro-Donald Trump operation. Perhaps a greater 
focus on the overarching goals of Russian information warfare efforts would be beneficial, 
especially for framing the problem as a whole-of-society issue and getting the executive branch 
not to see efforts to call out Russian efforts as a challenge to the Presidential administration. 
 
Recommendations  
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The focus of the following recommendations is on government action to mitigate the impact of 
targeted disinformation campaigns. Given legitimate concerns over the restriction of First-
Amendment rights, any effective government action must be bi-partisan, relatively 
uncontroversial, and easily implemented. As modern disinformation operations are not married 
to a particular election cycle, political candidate, or political party, efforts to combat them need 
to be sustainable in the long-term and involve a cohesive government approach.  
 
With these concerns in mind, there are multiple options to combat targeted disinformation. US 
law prohibits foreign participation in US elections and permits extensive regulation of 
commercial advertising204. This fact gives ample room to develop a measured, bi-partisan, 
cohesive, and time-sensitive government response that covers each stage of the disinformation 
model. A practical, government-led response will have four main components. First, to allocate 
government responsibility. Second, to strengthen and promote methods of information sharing 
between the public and private sectors. Third, to increase the liability of online social media 
platforms. Lastly, to build resilience through public education. 
 
Social media platforms have made recent efforts to combat disinformation, such as the use of 
third-party fact-checkers and a greater focus on identifying and deactivating inauthentic 
accounts205 206. Also, Facebook and Instagram now permit organizations that buy political or 
issue-oriented advertising to run them only under identities that the platform has first verified207. 
In recent months, following the takedown of disinformation regarding the Hong Kong protests, 
Twitter updated its advertising policies whereby it “will not accept advertising from state-
controlled news media entities. Any affected accounts will be free to continue to use Twitter to 
engage in the public conversation, just not our advertising products.”208. Despite this, most 
efforts could be considered reactive and would benefit from centralized and cohesive 
government leadership. Since social media platforms have a financial incentive to permit content 
that attracts user attention, whether factual or false, they are unlikely to adjust their business 
models without external pressure209.   
 
Allocate Government Responsibility 
 
The first step is to centralize counter-disinformation efforts and allocate responsibility to a single 
governmental party. No one section of the United States government explicitly accepts a 
leadership role in the area of foreign disinformation. An agency, such as the Department of 
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Homeland security, should be designated as a lead agency on this issue210. Identifying and 
establishing a government agency to own the issue of targeted disinformation will have several 
positive impacts across each stage of the disinformation model. 
 
First, all government actors could come together effectively and form best practices for 
combatting foreign disinformation. These best practices would spread to other areas on the 
frontline, creating a more cohesive and efficient response altogether. Additionally, this unified 
front could aggressively call out and respond to false narratives in a unified fashion, before they 
take on a power of their own. Second, this unification would centralize information sources, and 
lead to improved knowledge sharing with those in the private sector. Social media outlets such as 
Facebook have already accepted some responsibility for removing false and malicious content 
from their platform211. Strengthening the bond between them and the intelligence community 
would enhance efficiency, effectiveness, and the speed of which false narratives and their 
sources are identified and shut down. 
 
These system-level improvements would combat foreign disinformation in its early phases. A 
better understanding of what particular activity to look for, and a clear, unified defense strategy 
would identify and eliminate false and malicious narratives before they spread into the 
information ecosystem. Also, a centralized government response that allows high-speed 
information sharing means a better overall understanding of disinformation actor intentions. 
Understanding these intentions is a critical component of defense and enables social media 
platforms to identify and take down disinformation more quickly and effectively212. Online 
platforms with greater access to real-time intelligence of how foreign actors are specifically 
targeting a particular audience allow for identifying threats more purposefully and efficiently213. 
 
Promote Information Sharing  
 
Due to the complexities of modern disinformation efforts, cooperation is necessary to limit the 
spread of disinformation. It takes action from platforms themselves that understand the 
technology, governments to provide proper oversight, and independent researchers to continually 
offer insight. Investment into a multi-stakeholder approach that integrates government, private, 
and outside initiatives is critical to sharing information responding effectively. A multi-
stakeholder approach is the status quo in other industries. Information sharing and analysis 
centers exist in health care, financial services, and aviation, and facilitate threat information 
sharing between the public and private sectors.  
 
There are similar coalitions in the technology industry. For instance, the Global Internet Forum 
to Counter Terrorism (GICT) is a coalition where the UN, technology companies, non-
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governmental organizations, and academics collaborate to disrupt extremist online content214. 
This coalition, formed through efforts of large technology companies in 2017, focuses on joint 
technology innovation, knowledge sharing, and conducting and funding research to identify and 
remove extremist content from online platforms more effectively215. A similar initiative to 
combat disinformation could use an independent advisory committee, as the GICT does, that 
includes government representatives to ensure action taken is in line with US national security 
interests.  
 
Also, this initiative could utilize technological advances such as the Hash database formed 
through the GICT. The Hash database was developed as a tool to contain “hashes” or digital 
fingerprints of known terrorist images and videos which are shared with each company that joins 
the GIFCT’s Hash Sharing Consortium216. Once a company has access to the hash database, it 
can deploy tools to automatically spot duplicates of the same content when it is uploaded on their 
platform. There is an existing tool in the disinformation space, called ‘Hamilton 68’, that could 
play a similar role. “Hamilton 68” is an online dashboard launched through the Alliance for 
Securing Democracy that provides a real-time look into Russian propaganda and disinformation 
efforts online. This initiative would assist online platforms, governments, and independent 
researchers to share valuable information, rather than operating independently. Hamilton 68 is a 
system that brings together messaging from overt and covert Russian propaganda outlets, and 
automated accounts to identify central themes and messaging priorities. The project’s stated 
objective is to help identify Russian messaging themes and detect active disinformation 
campaigns as soon as they begin217.  
 
Exposing these themes puts a spotlight onto actor intentions and makes disinformation easier to 
identify and remove before it spreads. Efforts such as this will be crucial to provide social media 
companies the information necessary to take down accounts and pages that are spreading 
disinformation swiftly. Multi-stakeholder initiatives such as this ought to be backed by the 
federal government. Identifying relevant foreign disinformation sources and their messaging 
themes is a meticulous and tiresome process, and efforts to make the job of social media 
platforms simpler would have a substantial impact. 
 
Increase Online Platform Liability 
  
Due to the inherent revenue models of social media platforms, a valid government response must 
apply pressure to increase the responsibility and liability of platforms to take action to combat 
disinformation. This added responsibility will motivate platforms to take down malicious 
content, but also make efforts to decrease the ability of disinformation actors to push and amplify 
false narratives through algorithmic manipulation. Ways to increase the liability and 
responsibility of companies that operate online platforms are gaining attention within the 
government. Senator Mark Warner, a leading congressional figure in the fight against 
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disinformation, argues that platforms will need to be made more liable for claims like 
“defamation, invasion of privacy, false light, public discourse of private facts, and doctored 
footage.”218 Online social media platforms must identify inauthentic accounts and actively 
referee the spread of disinformation with a threat of sanction, perhaps by a government body 
such as the Federal Trade Commission. Significant and realistic steps toward increasing platform 
liability and responsibility will be to follow through on existing proposals to change the 
Communications Delivery Act, enact common-sense advertising reform, and create a “nutrition 
label” for internet privacy. 
 
Communications Delivery Act 
 
Changes to section 230 of the Communications Delivery Act should be made. These changes 
would increase the obligation that platforms have to monitor disinformation. Section 230 of the 
Communications Delivery Act was created for two reasons219. First, to ensure that online 
platforms are not liable for content posted by users, similar to publisher standards in other 
industries. Second, to give platforms legal impunity to use their technical expertise to police and 
moderate their sites as they see fit without the fear of lawsuits. Here, the central purpose is to 
empower online platforms to moderate themselves.  
 
Changes to section 230 should be centered around increasing the liability of platforms for 
targeted disinformation that is created and disseminated by foreign actors. An increase in 
responsibility could lead influential platforms to more actively referee, and potentially identify 
and remove disinformation before it gains momentum. A compelling voice for section 230 has 
been US Senator Ron Wyden. Senator Wyden has stated that section 230 is intended to be both a 
“sword” and a “shield.”220 These statements are contrary to a prevailing view that section 230 
gives companies an excuse not to moderate their platforms221. Section 230 has a broad 
interpretation and requires a greater focus on the liability it produces for online platforms. A 
debate is needed over whether companies are adequately using their immunity, and the 
subsequent responsibility to create novel and consistent ways to moderate their technologies.  
 
The immunity that section 230 provides ought to better align with a centralized government 
strategy to fight disinformation. Some have argued that taking down content with a political 
leaning should void section 230 immunities222. Perhaps, in the context of disinformation, not 
acting on shared information about sources of disinformation, or working to find novel ways to 
moderate would void section 230 protections in the form of sanctions. This argument rests on the 
basis that the internet is not neutral; rather, it ought to exist for society’s overall benefit. The 
public’s opportunity to make rational judgments is of paramount importance, and the presence of 
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disinformation disrupts the public’s ability to form reasonable opinions and make sound 
judgments.     
 
Advertising Reform 
 
Common sense advertising reform can combat algorithmic manipulation. Here, improvements 
ought to center around curbing advertisers’ ability to target and track potential customers online. 
Foreign disinformation actors can capitalize on online platforms’ use of user data to target 
specific audiences that are vulnerable to particular messaging. Two existing proposals do well in 
this area, have bipartisan support, and should be passed. First is the “Do Not Track Me Online 
Act,” introduced in 2011. This legislation includes enforcement for an online opt-out 
mechanism, enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, to ensure that platforms or websites 
may not use personal data to target and track an individual. Under this act, unsolicited use of user 
data would be regarded as an unfair and deceptive act or practice affecting commerce prescribed 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act223.  
 
Second is the Honest Ads Act. This legislation was introduced by US Senators Mark Warner, 
Amy Klobuchar, and Lindsey Graham. The goal of this legislation is to prevent foreign 
interference in US elections and improve the transparency of online political advertising. The act 
was put forth as a response to Russia’s buying and placing of ads during the 2016 election, 
utilizing online platforms usage of user data to target specific populations. The Honest Ads Act 
would deter foreign actors from influencing elections by taking steps to ensure that the same 
rules cover advertisements sold online as ads sold on TV, radio, and satellite224. Providing the 
disclosure of this information improves overall transparency, thus preventing foreign actors from 
using personal data to target vulnerable segments of the general population through advertising.  
 
The Honest Ads Act would make companies disclose how much money specific ads cost, the 
number of views an ad gets, how the ad specifically targets potential consumers, and the contact 
information of who is buying an ad225. Specifically, the Honest Ads Act would improve online 
advertisement disclosure by amending the definition of “electioneering communication” in 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, to include paid internet and digital 
advertisements226. It would also require digital platforms with at least 50,000,000 monthly 
visitors to maintain a public file of all electioneering communications purchased by a person or 
group who spends a significant amount of money on online advertising227. These steps require 
that online platforms more actively ensure that foreign actors cannot purchase political 
advertisements to influence the American public.  
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Nutrition Label 
 
A “nutrition label” for internet privacy would be a simple tool that consumers could look at to 
understand what the privacy impact of an online platform is before they use it. Due to the 
inherent revenue model of online social media platforms, advertisers and technology companies 
are continually finding new ways to collect and monetize data. A significant barrier to consumers 
understanding where and how their data is being used is the privacy policies of online platforms. 
These policies are usually convoluted and ever-changing.  
 
This label would be as easy to use as a standard nutrition label, with its content managed by a 
government agency similar to the FDA228.  The label would fully disclose what actions platforms 
take with an individual’s data, and provide notifications to any change in company policies. 
Protecting and educating consumers in this way would help them to gain a better understanding 
of where their data might be going, and less likely to share data on platforms that can be utilized 
by foreign disinformation actors. This action would strengthen the publics’ ability to make 
informed decisions about the data they are putting online and increase their digital literacy. 
 
The nutrition label approach is a consumer consent strategy, rather than a harm-based one. The 
label would give individuals the power to make decisions based on the information they gather 
themselves. For this reason, a nutrition label for online privacy could be passed in a bipartisan 
manner. Privacy policies are typically difficult to understand, allowing companies not fully to 
disclose how personal data is used. Greater transparency of data usage means that consumers can 
be more skeptical of specific policies, more mindful of where their data go, and how they are 
used, with the end goal of a greater understanding of how foreign actors can utilize personal data. 
As the usage of sites with unclear data usage policies decreases due to this understanding, it will 
become more difficult for disinformation actors to use personal data to spread purposefully false 
and malicious content. 
 
Building Public Resilience 
  
A vital aspect of combating targeted disinformation campaigns is to build public resilience. 
Public resilience is essential for two main reasons. First, creating a climate favorable to solutions 
on foreign disinformation is necessary as any government solutions will require favorable public 
opinion229. Second, the brunt of the effort to combat disinformation campaigns ultimately falls 
on the users of online communication platforms. Without users willing to endorse and share 
disinformation, disinformation campaigns would be deprived of the fuel that powers them230. 
Malicious online content can infect the thought process of a population similar to a virus231. The 
antidote, in this case, is the knowledge that foreign actors are actively trying to influence public 
opinion through social media, and what their strategy entails.  
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Media literacy campaigns can be an effective means of protecting users against the disease like 
qualities of disinformation. The U.S.-based National Association for Media Literacy Education 
defines media literacy as “the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, create, and act using all forms 
of communication…Media literacy empowers people to be critical thinkers, effective 
communicators, and active citizens”232. There are indications that the American public senses the 
need to become more media literate. Studies indicate that news consumers admitted difficulty 
distinguishing between real news and false information during the 2016 US presidential 
election233. Additionally, individuals believed that accuracy, impartiality, and transparency were 
the most critical factors in trusted news sources, and wished that the news industry did a more 
thorough job of vetting information234.  
 
Investing in public education and strengthening public awareness addresses the “useful idiot” 
problem, where unwitting members of a target population spread disinformation that has been 
targeted towards them. The spreading of false narratives through domestic voices is a primary 
means of effectively implementing a disinformation campaign. Making the general public more 
aware and less likely to believe information from dubious sources decreases a foreign actor’s 
ability to influence the general public. There ought to be a wide-ranging effort to empower 
citizens and ensure the public is well-informed and well-equipped to use critical thinking skills 
when consuming information online235. A government-led media literacy campaign should focus 
on communicating how algorithmic ranking works and why disinformation spreads. Federal 
funding for media literacy programs will help consumers sort through information online, 
limiting the spread and overall impact of intentionally false and malicious content. 
 
Recent education efforts around the world should be studied. For instance, Finland has been 
conducting counter-disinformation efforts centered around public education and bolstering the 
critical-thinking skills of the Finnish public. Simple, yet effective, slogans such as “do not repeat 
lies,” are part of Finland’s comprehensive strategy to educate the public and counter Russian 
disinformation236. These efforts become less about correcting false information, and more about 
creating a positive counter-narrative, promoting the idea that combatting disinformation is a 
fundamental civic duty. 
 
Strong public education efforts are observable in other European countries such as Sweden and 
Estonia. Sweden has actively produced educational content for recent election cycles that explain 
what signs to look for regarding targeted disinformation237. Estonia has long been combatting 
disinformation campaigns of Russian origin and has a robust response with an active component 
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of public education238. Estonia actively counters the pro-Russian narrative by publically calling 
out false stories and directly blaming those responsible. The Estonian government regularly 
debunks stories emerging from Russian language media, and elected officials will carefully 
consider what outlets to provide comments. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This analysis has examined how targeted disinformation campaigns operate and why they are so 
useful in addition to highlighting avenues for potential time-sensitive and bi-partisan government 
action. An increased understanding of how information warfare is being conducted to influence 
democratic societies is vital. Modern targeted disinformation campaigns are currently being 
utilized for sowing discord within American democracy. These ongoing efforts are a cheap and 
effective way to create real harms that have a society-wide impact. This form of information 
warfare capitalizes on the inherent features of internet messaging platforms and the tenants of 
free democratic societies. In doing so, these tactics spread false and malicious content to promote 
chaos and fear, generate distrust toward government, and exacerbate existing social and political 
divides.  
 
Immediate government action can be taken to combat this threat. Modern disinformation 
operations are not married to a particular election cycle, political candidate, or political party, 
and efforts to combat them need to be sustainable in the long-term and involve a cohesive 
government approach. An effective, government-led response has four main components. First, 
to allocate government responsibility and centralize efforts to combat threat actors. Second, to 
strengthen and promote methods of information sharing between the public and private sectors. 
Third, to increase the liability of online social media platforms. Lastly, to build resilience 
through public education.  
 
Allocating government responsibility for the issue of targeted disinformation would establish 
guidelines and procedures, leading to a more transparent and cohesive response strategy. A 
centralized command structure would improve every other aspect of the response, especially 
regarding the ability to share information. Improved information sharing capabilities would 
strengthen the capacity to identify threat actors and the content that they produce quickly, and 
then communicate this vital information to those actively combating disinformation in the private 
sector.  
 
Further research should continue investigating ways to establish linkages between the public and 
private sectors. The private sector has a significant role to play in combating targeted 
disinformation as their platforms are the space where information warfare is taking place. As 
information and communications technology advance, information sharing to address policy 
issues becomes more feasible. Given the importance of quickly sharing information to an 
adequate response, identifying factors that can influence and strengthen information sharing at 
intra-organizational, inter-organizational, and interpersonal levels is critical239. 
                                                
238 Sarlo, A. (2017, June). Fighting Disinformation in the Baltic States. Retrieved from 
https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/fighting-disinformation-baltic-states/. 
239 Yang, T. M., & Maxwell, T. A. (2011). Information-sharing in public organizations: A literature review of interpersonal, 
intra-organizational and inter-organizational success factors. Government Information Quarterly, 28(2), 164-175. 
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Additionally, increasing platform liability is necessary. Increasing accountability would 
empower online platforms, under the direction of national security experts, to take down harmful 
disinformation produced by foreign actors and work toward novel technological solutions. Also, 
limits to the use of personal data by online platforms would decrease a threat actor’s ability to 
exploit the powerful algorithms used to generate revenue. Multiple policy solutions should be 
considered for this aspect of the response framework.  
 
First, further research is needed regarding changes to section 230 of the Communications Act. 
This research ought to explore whether changes to section 230 of the Communication Act would 
be an effective response to increasing platform liability. It is necessary to understand how 
platforms would react to these changes, and if overall efforts to combat disinformation would 
increase compared to a more open model that relies on the utilization of third-party fact-checking 
resources. Additionally, how would a more robust enforcement policy operate? Determining 
whether enforcement should run on an incentivized “carrot and stick” model, or a punishment-
based model with the threat of sanctions from a government body is a requirement to move 
forward with any changes.  
 
Another essential question to consider is whether an increased liability to remove malicious 
content produced by foreign actors would reduce the overall impact of targeted disinformation, 
and would this progress be worth the legal battle that would stem from increasing the liability of 
online platforms? Here, efforts should build on and apply existing research into what the legal 
ramifications of these changes would be240. The following area of study brings up a vital limit to 
research in the field of disinformation. The difficulty lies in being able to pin down the real 
impact of targeted disinformation on the public. Determining whether an individual or collective 
would or would not have formulated a particular opinion based on exposure to disinformation is 
fruitless, due to the wide variety of alternative causal mechanisms. Rather than measures of 
influence such as public opinion or levels of polarization, researchers should utilize more precise 
tests that examine levels of activity. For instance, the amount of disinformation content created 
by foreign actors, how quickly and effectively this content is spread, and how many users are 
exposed to and interact with dishonest content.  
 
Second, additional research into the Honest Ads Act is required. Specifically, research should 
address how increasing advertising transparency would decrease the ability for algorithmic 
manipulation. Over time, would there be a significant reduction in targeted ads places by foreign 
actors designed to manipulate and amplify false content? Also, ways to strengthen the relatively 
loose definition of “political ads” should be examined, as this policy would not reach ads that are 
not considered to be political. Would this be a loophole that threat actors could manipulate? An 
additional gap may be the particular limits on spending required for advertising transparency. 
Research should explore how exactly foreign actors can buy advertising on smaller scales and 
through disguising operations to make foreign efforts look like domestic ones. Also, further 
research into a “nutrition label” for internet privacy is needed. Research questions should 
examine how information consumers would utilize such a tool. Would this label make consumers 
less likely to place their information in online spaces that have an unclear policy and are ripe for 
manipulation?  
                                                
240 Hwang, T. (2017). Dealing with Disinformation: Evaluating the Case for CDA 230 Amendment. Available at SSRN 3089442. 
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These policy initiatives are a useful place to begin combatting targeted disinformation. However, 
these efforts do not reach the logic of social media sites that reward outrage and bias 
confirmation like organic social media posts, personalized feeds, and troll farms. Understanding 
ways to reach these aspects without changing the ability of social media platforms to operate 
freely is vital. The overall difficulty of addressing the fundamental characteristics of social media 
revenue generation makes the element of building public resilience critical.   
 
A central component of a cohesive, whole-of-society approach to combat disinformation is to 
invest in public education. This investment would give citizens more opportunities to use their 
critical thinking to limit the impact of false and malicious content that is created and 
disseminated by foreign actors. Further research should address what specific components of 
successful education efforts, particularly in Baltic and Scandinavian countries, would be 
transferable to the United States. Research questions should examine how precisely an American 
social media literacy curriculum would look. Aspects of past successful public education 
initiatives that utilize online marketing, including the successful and federally funded anti-
smoking campaign, should continue to be studied and applied241. Research questions should also 
examine the development and implementation of a critical-thinking news consumption 
curriculum for elementary education to instill long-lasting positive habits.  
 
Effectively responding to the challenges that society faces require substantial cooperation. 
Societies’ ability to cooperate is threatened when the means of gathering and analyzing 
information is disrupted. The chaos and discord produced by targeted disinformation campaigns 
are real and ongoing. However, swift and decisive government action can be impactful, primarily 
as the United States builds up to the 2020 presidential election, and works toward finding 
solutions in response to critical issues such as the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent economic 
crisis, racial injustice and inequality, and climate change. 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
241 Impact of first federally funded anti-smoking ad campaign remains strong after three years. (2016, March 24). Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2016/p0324-anti-smoking.html 
